Dr. Ken Brown

 Abstract

The idea that war invariably involves a violent clash of arms is deeply embedded within American academic and military psyches. As a result, studies of war typically assume that Western precepts are universally held. The question this raises, however, is whether other nations hold different conceptualizations of war and, if so, the implications this creates for US strategies, plans, and operations. To examine this puzzle, this article uses the lens of strategic culture to conduct a comparative case study of US and Chinese perceptions of what war entails. Based on an examination of the academic literature, official documents, statements, media reports, and the states’ behaviors, this article finds that the US and China have fundamentally different temporal, material, and normative frameworks on war that not only undermine their ability to communicate, but also create significant risks for national security decision-making based on Western cognitive frameworks. Collectively, these findings directly challenge the commonly held wisdom on the universal applicability of the US definition of war and raise important questions about the strategies, policies, doctrine, and plans that flow from it.

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